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The world leaders at the Millennium Summit of the United
Nations adopted the Millennium Declarations in September
2000, and committed their nations to the cause of reducing
extreme poverty in the world and to the setting of time-
bound targets. To this effect, they have identified and
agreed on the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) con-
taining eight specific goals, the first of which is the* Corresponding author.
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http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.iimb.2012.06.003eradication of extreme hunger and poverty (UN Millennium
Project, 2005). According to a report by the United Nations
Food and Agriculture Organization (2002) on the long-term
development of world food and agriculture for the next
three decades, serious food shortages are expected to
persist at regional and local levels. This report also suggests
that appropriate interventions as well as increased inter-
national agricultural trade may moderate the magnitude
and the effect of the supply shortage problem. Since a large
proportion of the population in developing countries is rural
and engaged in agriculture, the above-mentioned Millen-
nium Development Goal is closely related to the profit-
ability and the crop yield management of small-scale
farmers in those countries.
The most common approach for addressing the problems
of the global and national food security as well as the rural
poverty and equity issues has been government intervention
e in the forms of energy subsidies, virtually free access to
irrigation, crop support, and grain procurement. While suchn and hosting by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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term relief to the farmers, their outcomes have been at best
mixed in terms of providing long-term sustainable solutions.
The problemwithmany government-initiated programmes is
that engendering changes often involves a long and chal-
lenging political process. Meanwhile, the private sector may
play an increasing role in improving the overall efficiency in
the agriculture industry and the agri-business industry. This
improvement could be achieved through non-traditional
methods such as investing in infrastructure, adopting new
technologies like drought-resistant high-yield strains, and
successfully implementing crop diversification strategies.
Corporations often have better access to models for
commodity pricing andweather forecasting, that could be of
potential benefit to local farmers.
One of the avenues of forming a symbiotic partnership
between private corporations and farmers is through
contract farming. Under this arrangement, the corporation
requests farmers to plant a specific crop, and purchases it
according to the initially agreed upon terms of the
contract. The corporation benefits from this relationship
since it can secure the quantity and quality of the desired
crop which may not be sufficiently available in the area. In
addition, it possibly reduces or eliminates certain expenses
associated with transportation, storage and spoilage. The
farmer often earns a higher and stable revenue, and obtains
access to capital, technology and information that would
increase his yield and that would otherwise not be easily
obtainable (Rehber, 1998).
Despite several potential advantages of contract farming
to both the corporation and the farmers, one of the prob-
lems associated with its implementation is that the farmers
may sell outside the contract (Food and Agriculture
Organization, 2001). This phenomenon, referred to as
extra-contractual marketing, has caused some corpora-
tions either to monitor the farmers more closely or to
abandon contract farming altogether. It is exacerbated by
the fact that, in many developing countries, it is difficult to
enforce the terms of the contract due to the complexity of
the legal system (Reardon & Barrett, 2000; Reardon &
Berdegue, 2002; Runsten & Key, 1996). It is reported that
the first large-scale demonstration of contract farming in
India, initiated by Pepsi Foods in India, “bound the farmer
morally rather than legally” (Khairnar & Yeleti, 2005).
Motivated by this concern, we consider a model of
contract farming which explicitly accounts for the possi-
bility of the farmer’s reneging. We model the system with
a single firm and multiple homogeneous farmers. The firm is
a manufacturer of a processed food product that is based
on a farm crop. On the demand side, she faces exogenous
uncertain demand for the product. On the supply side, we
are particularly interested in the case in which the manu-
facturer newly builds a production capacity in a developing
country where the raw material for non-staple crops has
not been traditionally available in large quantities, and she
offers contracts to the farmers for the crop e the rationale
for the contract farming based on this has been pointed out
by Key and Runsten (1999). We also allow that the manu-
facturer may also purchase the crop from the external
market that exhibits a volatile price. Since the market
system is not well established in developing countries, the
transportation (or transaction) cost cannot be ignored, andwe include it in our model. The farmer, if entered into the
contract, plants the crop and is supposed to deliver his
yield to the manufacturer, but we allow the possibility that
the farmer may renege on the contract and sell the crop
directly to the market if the market price is attractive
compared to the contract price. We analyse this model, and
compare it to (1) the case of no contract; and (2) the case
of a contract without reneging.
From our interaction with a multinational corporation in
the food processing industry that has been engaged in
contract farming, we identify three primary sources of
uncertainty in forecasting and in planning for future oper-
ations: (i) the commodity prices of farm products that serve
as raw materials for its manufacturing operations, (ii) the
amount of supply of these products which depends on crop
planting as well as crop conditions that are largely affected
by the weather and water availability, and (iii) consumer
demand or market conditions which follow population and
demographic trends. We incorporate these types of uncer-
tainty into our model.
In this paper, we take the view of the manufacturer who
wants to maximise her expected profit. A natural question
that arises is the following: Which of the three contract
models will result in the highest expected profit for the
manufacturer? We show that the contract can be beneficial
to the firm even when the farmers may renege. Moreover,
while the dominance between the two contracts (one with
reneging and one without) cannot be established, we show,
somewhat counter-intuitively, that the farmer’s reneging
option may benefit the manufacturer. We then identify
under which conditions such a benefit can be expected. For
instance, in the special case of deterministic demand and
yield and risk-averse farmers, we formally prove that the
reneging option results in a greater payoff for the
manufacturer. Thus, the farmer’s reneging is not simply to
be avoided or prevented; if this possibility is properly
managed and leveraged, it may increase the manufac-
turer’s bottom line.
Literature review
There is a large body of literature on the application of
operations research and operations management to the
farmer’s crop planning e see, for example, Glen (1987),
Lowe and Preckel (2004) and Huh and Lall (2008). When the
yield is uncertain, there is a risk of supply and demand
mismatch and such a risk is managed and mitigated by the
capacity-production decision that accounts for such
uncertainty (Allen & Schuster, 2004; Kazaz, 2008), or by the
second production opportunity (Jones, Kegler, Lowe, &
Traub, 2003; Jones, Lowe, Traub, & Kegler, 2001; Jones,
Lowe, & Traub, 2002; Kazaz, 2008). All these papers are
presented in the context of a single decision maker and do
not consider any contract structure.
Much of the existing research on contract farming is
empirical or case-based (e.g., Runsten and Key (1996) and
Warning and Key (2002)). There are a limited number of
recent analytic models for the use of contracts in the
agriculture business. Burer, Jones, and Lowe (2008)
examine two commonly used contracts in the agricultural
seed industry between the seed supplier and the retailers,
called the “pure bonus scheme” and “mixed scheme”, and
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under random yield in agriculture. However, these models
do not directly address the contract farming problem
between a firm and many farmers.
We mention several analytical works related to contract
farming. Ghosh and Raychaudhuri (2010) analyse how
contract farming is used by the farmer as a protection
against price risk in India, where proper insurance system
does not exist. Delpierre (2005) considers the possibility of
multiple buyers competing with each other. Patlolla (2010)
studies the sugarcane contract farming in India, and shows
that the buyer can ensure higher quality of crops by using
an alternative contract scheme. Thome and Sexton (2007)
study the possibility of reneging by the buyer not the
farmer.
Contract farming is similar to a well-known concept in
operations management called contract manufacturing,
where the contract manufacturer and the original equip-
ment manufacturer enter into a contract based on core
competency (Plambeck & Taylor, 2005; €Ulk€u, Toktay, &
Y€ucesan, 2007). In the case where the contracts are
court-enforceable, Plambeck and Taylor (2006, 2007c,
2007d) show that the use of informal agreements (informal
contracts) can attain the optimal outcome, especially in
the environment of repeated interaction where the pros-
pect of future business depends on current actions (see also
Domberger (1998)). In contrast to this literature, we model
a single-period interaction since the farmer may be too
poor or too myopic to consider the benefit of future inter-
actions. While the reneging opportunity in our model is one-
sided (only the farmer may renege on the contract in our
model), we mention that Plambeck and Taylor (2007a,
2007b) consider the case where multiple parties decide to
renegotiate depending on the outcome of uncertain events.
This assumption is consistent with the realities of the
contract farming in developing countries (Brennan, 2004).
A number of papers in the economics literature have
addressed the issue of bargaining power between the firm
(buyer) and farmers (suppliers). It has been noted that the
farmer’s share of the total profit increases as his outside
option (alternative production possibility) improves and as
his relative bargaining power increases (Swinnen &
Vandeplas, 2007). Since there are multiple farmers but
a single firm, the firm is endowed with monopsony power
(Sivramkrishna & Jyotishi, 2008). Salas (2009) proposes the
formation of a “bargaining group” to shift the market
power from the buyer to the sellers. In our paper, we model
the presence of the outside option for the farmer, but we
assume that the buyer has complete bargaining power and
maximises her expected profit.
A distinguishing feature of our paper is that we model
contract farming in the context of a larger supply chain. We
consider not only the relationship between the farmers and
the manufacturer, but also the manufacturer’s production
decision facing uncertain demand. Our modelling of
demand places contract farming in the framework of the
newsvendor problem, well known in the operations
management literature. We are particularly interested in
the conditions under which the manufacturer would benefit
from a contract that cannot enforce the farmer’s compli-
ance. This problem is of considerable interest to firms
operating in developing countries such as India.Organisation
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. We first
present a detailed description of the model. We then
analyse the case where both the yield and demand distri-
butions are deterministic. We include and discuss both
analytical and numerical findings. Then we extend our
results to the general model with stochastic yield and
demand.
Model
We consider a manufacturer in the food processing
industry, who takes a farm crop as a raw material and
transforms it into a finished product (e.g. food). This
product has traditionally been unavailable in the area;
however, its demand is now emerging (due to industriali-
sation and globalisation), and the manufacturing facility is
set up to target such a trend in demand. Let D denote
a random variable representing the quantity of demand for
the product. (In this paper, we use lower case variables to
represent the realised values of corresponding upper case
random variables.) Let r denote its selling price, which is
constant and exogenously given.
We assume that the farm crop that the manufacturer
requires has also been unavailable in the area (due to the
incompatibility of the crop with the traditional diet or the
magnitude of the manufacturer’s requirement), and that
there are two ways of securing the supply of the crop. We
describe them in the following two paragraphs.
(i) The manufacturer can procure the required crop by
importing it from an outside market, in which case she
is subject to an additional transportation cost (or
transaction cost), and she is also exposed to the price
uncertainty of the crop. Let KM be the unit trans-
portation cost from the market to the manufacturer
(which is a constant), and let P denote the random
variable for the market price of the crop. The value of
P is initially stochastic, and it is realised at the end of
season when the crop is harvested.
(ii) Alternatively, the manufacturer can encourage the
local farmers to grow the farm crop by offering them
contracts. We model the contract between the
manufacturer and a farmer such that both parties
agree that the entire harvest of the crop will be sold at
an agreed-upon price bp, which we refer to as the
contract price. Note that this contract is simple and
specified by a single parameter (price), an attractive
feature in the rural economies of developing countries.
In our model, the manufacturer offers the contract
price, which each farmer may accept or reject. The
manufacturer also decides the number of farmers to
whom she offers the contract. (The number of farmers
in this paper is essentially a proxy for the size of the
contract representing the amount of land under the
contract.)
In our model, there are multiple farmers and they are
all indistinguishable from one another; thus, it suffices to
consider a representative farmer who possesses a unit
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cost for signing the contract, which corresponds to the
profit from the traditional use of the land. (We allow that
C may be random.) Any farmer who signs the contract will
plant the crop. Let Y denote the random variable repre-
senting the yield of the crop per unit area. (In the farming
setting, the randomness in yield is typically due to the
amount of rainfall and the use of fertilizers e see Li, Li,
and Li (2004) for the case of wheat.) We incorporate
into our model the possibility of reneging by farmers. Let
KF be the unit transportation cost from any farmer to the
market, which is a constant. If a farmer sells the crop to
the market, he generates the net revenue of p  KF per
unit, where p is a realised value of P. Thus, if the realised
market price p is sufficiently high, i.e., p KF > bp, then it
is profitable for the farmer to renege on the contract and
sell his crop to the market. The phenomenon of reneging is
not uncommon in developing countries since the legal
systems are too complex for the contracts to become
enforceable and the farmers are too myopic to appreciate
the benefit of the long-term relationship with the
manufacturer.
In contrast to the farmers, the manufacturer in our
model does not have the flexibility to renege on the
contract. The manufacturer often represents a large
(possibly multinational) corporation, and reneging is too
costly in terms of tarnishing her reputation and risking
adverse political repercussions. However, if a farmer
reneges on the contract, the manufacturer may choose to
make a counteroffer, and this counteroffer will be
accepted by the farmer if it is at least p  KF, and rejected
otherwise. We allow that the manufacturer may choose to
generate counteroffers to only a subset of the farmers who
have reneged.
We present the sequence of events in detail.
(i) The manufacturer decides the contract price bp and the
number of farmers q to which the contract is offered.
Then, each farmer either accepts or rejects the
contract. If the contract is accepted, the farmer plants
the crop in his farmland; if rejected, he saves the
opportunity cost C, which is realised at this point.
(ii) The yield Y is realised, and each farmer harvests y
units of the crop, where y is a realised value of Y. TheTable 1 Model parameters and variables.
Stochastic parameters
D Demand for fin
P Market price of
Y Crop yield
C Opportunity co
Deterministic parameters
r Selling price of
KM Unit transp. co
KF Unit transp. co
Decision variablesbp Contract price
q Number of farm
x Total crop quan
z Production quamarket price P is also realised, and its realised value is
denoted by p.
(iii) Each farmer who has accepted the contract decides
whether to honour the contract or to renege on the
contract. If he honours the contract, the manufacturer
buys y units of the crop from him at the price of bp per
unit. Let x denote the total amount of the crop the
manufacturer possesses at this point. (Clearly, x y$q.)
(iv) The manufacturer decides the production quantity z
for the product. For simplicity, we assume that one
unit of the crop is needed to produce one unit of the
product, and that any production cost other than the
price of the crop can be ignored. To any farmer who
has reneged on the contract, the manufacturer has an
option of making a counteroffer (with a new price),
which may or may not be accepted.If a farmer does not
sell his crop to the manufacturer, then he sells it to the
market generating the revenue of p per unit and
incurring the transportation cost of KF per unit. The
manufacturer purchases the shortage quantity of the
crop, if any, from the market at p per unit, incurring
the transportation cost of KM per unit.
(v) Demand D for the product is realised, and the manu-
facturer satisfies realised demand d to the extent
possible. The sales quantity for the product is min{d,
z}, and the revenue to the manufacturer is r$min{d, z}.
Any unsold product is scrapped at no additional value
or cost (Table 1).
While the manufacturer can purchase the crop from the
market, we note that she does not sell excess crop to the
market. This assumption, based on our interaction with
multinational manufacturing firms operating in a devel-
oping country, plays an important role in our paper, and
such a phenomenon is reasonable (a) when the distribution
logistics of the manufacturer are dedicated to her product
and are not suited for the farm crop e for example, unable
to circumvent perishability of degradation in quality over
time, (b) when the manufacturer desires to cultivate
a symbiotic relationship with the farmers by avoiding direct
competition as sellers in the same market, and (c) when
government regulation or complexity of local social struc-
ture poses the manufacturer (often a multinational firm)
a barrier of entry in the domestic raw material marketished product produced by firm
crop
st to farmer of accepting contract
product
st to manufacturer of procuring crop from market
st to farmer of selling crop to market
offered
ers offered a contract
tity acquired using contracts
ntity of finished product
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of production other than the cost of the crop, it follows
that the production quantity of the manufacturer will be at
least the amount of the crop she collects from the con-
tracted farmers in step (iii), i.e., z  x.
We are now ready to discuss the objective functions of
the farmer and the manufacturer. In our model, each
farmer is risk-averse, and we assume that his economic
benefit is represented by a utility function Uð$Þ that is
concave increasing in his net profit; he wants to maximise
his expected utility. In contrast, we assume that the
manufacturer is risk-neutral and that she maximises her
expected profit. In our discussion, it is helpful to note that
in step (iv) the farmer will accept any counteroffer that is
at least the price he can fetch from the market minus the
transportation cost, and thus the profit-maximising manu-
facturer sets her counteroffer price at p  KF. Then, the
farmer’s expected utility is EC½UðCÞ if he rejects the
contract; otherwise, his objective is to maximisePFZE
UY$maxbp;P KF:
Returning to the manufacturer, he purchases x units at
the contract price bp, and he can purchase up to Y$q  x
units by making counteroffers at the price of P  KF. Any
additional unit can be bought from the market at the net
cost of P þ KM per unit. Since the amount of her sales is min
{D, z}, it follows that the manufacturer’s profit is given byPMZ x$bp Ehðminfz;Y$qg xÞ$ðP KFÞ
 ½z Y$qþ$ðPþ KMÞ þ rminfD;zg
i
:
(1)
In our model, there are two types of uncertainty, one
involving price (the market price P and the opportunity
cost C ), and the other involving quantity (crop yield Y
and product demand D). We first address in the following
section the case where uncertainty arises only from the
market price, and then we consider both types of
uncertainty.
Deterministic yield and demand
In this section, we consider the case where the only
stochastic variables are the market price P and the oppor-
tunity cost C. Thus, both Y and D are deterministic, which
we denote by y and d, respectively. While we analyse the
behaviour of both the manufacturer and the farmers, the
subject of our primary interest is the manufacturer, and we
examine the benefit of the contract to the manufacturer
despite the possibility that farmers may renege. As a first
step, we consider the benchmark model where no contract
is offered. Next we present the analysis of our model, and
subsequently we study a modified model where the farmers
cannot renege. Finally we investigate the performance of
the contract with reneging by comparing it to the two
related models.A benchmark model: without contract
We first consider as a benchmark the case where no
contract is offered. This model is useful not only in
quantifying the benefit of contract farming, but also in
analysing both types of contracts that follow. Here,
the farmer only has the “outside option” which is
the opportunity cost. Thus he obtains the expected
utility of
PNCF ZE½UðCÞ:
(The superscript NC represents “no contract”.) For the
manufacturer, since the selling price of her product is r, she
purchases the crop from the market only if the net cost
P þ KM is below r. Since D Z d is deterministic, the
manufacturer’s expected profit is given by
PNCM Zd$EP½r ðPþ KMÞþ: (2)Contract with reneging: analysis
We now address the original model with reneging described
in the section “Model”. We solve this model in a backward
manner starting with step (v) toward step (i). Since steps
(ii) and (v) do not involve any decision, we consider steps
(iv), (iii) and (i).
Step (iv): manufacturer’s decision for z
We first analyse the manufacturer’s decision for the
production quantity z in step (iv) of the model. Recall that x
represents the amount of the crop that the manufacturer
has purchased from the farmers based on the contract,
where x  y$q. From an earlier discussion, z must satisfy
z  x. If this inequality is strict, then the manufacturer
needs to procure the additional units either from making
counteroffers to the reneged farmers or from the market.
Since the revenue that a reneging farmer can fetch from
the market is p  KF per unit, any counteroffer that is at
least as good as this price will be accepted; as a result, the
manufacturer can procure up to y$q  x units (which is the
total reneged quantity) at the price of p  KF per unit. She
can procure the remaining units from the market at
a higher cost of p þ KM per unit which includes the trans-
portation cost.
The optimal decision for z depends on the realised value
of the market price p for the farm crop (raw material) in
comparison to the sales price of the product, r. Recall that
in this section we assume that demand d is deterministic. If
p is sufficiently low, i.e., p  r  KM, then she satisfies all
the demand; thus, zZ max{d, y$q}. If p ˛ (r  KM, r þ KF),
it is optimal to procure only from counteroffers to reneged
farmers where the price of the counteroffer would be
p  KF ˛ (r  KM  KF, r). In this case, since the amount of
the crop that the manufacturer possesses and the reneged
quantity sum up to y$q, it follows that z Z min{max{d, x},
y$q}. If p > r þ KF, then the crop price is prohibitively
expensive to make any additional crop purchase, i.e.,
z Z x. In summary, the manufacturer’s optimal decision in
step (iv) is
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8<:maxfd;y$qg if p r KMminfmaxfd;xg;y$qg if p˛ðr KM; rþ KF 
x if p> rþ KF :
(3)
Step (iii): farmer’s decision for reneging
We now consider a farmer’s decision in step (iii) regarding
whether to honour the contract or renege on it. If he
honour the contract, he will receive bp per unit from the
manufacturer. If he reneges on the contract, it follows
from our earlier analysis that his unit net revenue will be
p  KF regardless of whether the manufacturer makes
a price-matching counteroffer, or the farmer sells his
crop to the market. (Note that, at this point, the realised
value of the market price p is known.) Thus, it is optimal
for the farmer to honour the contract if p  bpþ KF and
renege on it otherwise. As a result, the amount of
inventory that the manufacturer receives at the end of
step (iii) is
xZ

y$q if p bpþ KF
0 otherwise:
(4)
Step (i): manufacturer’s decision for bp and q
Since there is no decision involved in step (ii), we now
consider step (i), in which the manufacturer sets the
contract price bp and the number of farmers q that she
offers the contract. This step takes place before the market
price uncertainty is resolved in step (ii). For each farmer,
the expected revenue given that he signs the contract and
plants the crop is y$maxfbp; P  KFg, which is stochastically
increasing in the contract price bp. Thus, a farmer accepts
the contract if the expected utility from the contract is at
least as high as the expected utility from the alternate
option, i.e.,
EP
Uy$maxbp;P KF EC½UðCÞ: (5)
Note that the left-hand size expression, representing the
expected utility from the contract, is a nondecreasing
function of bp. Thus, the above inequality is equivalent tobp bpLB; (6)
for some bpLB. Here, bpLB represents the contract price at
which the farmer is indifferent between the contract and
the outside option.
We make a few observations on how the farmer’s indif-
ference price bpLB depends on the distribution of the market
price P.
 As the market price P increases stochastically, the
left-hand-side expression of (5) increases while the
right-hand-side remains constant; thus, the threshold
price bpLB can be smaller. More intuitively, as the
farmer expects the market price to be higher, his
profit from reneging (or from a counteroffer) would
be higher. Thus, he is more likely to plant the crop,
and the contract price does not have to be as
attractive.
 As the market price P becomes more variable, the
farmer’s indifference bpLB tends to decrease. This occurssince the contract becomes more appealing as the
variability of the market price P increases e it opens the
possibility of a higher profit from reneging while the
downward risk is protected by the contract price. (We
can prove for a risk-neutral farmer for a symmetric price
distribution.) Let L be a symmetric distribution with
mean 0 and standard deviation 1 with a probability
density function f, and suppose P Z KF þ m þ sL,
where the mean and the standard deviation of P is
given by KF þ m and s, respectively. Let bzZbp m.
Then, EP ½maxfbp; P  KFgZmþ EL½maxfbz; sLg. Since
the probability density of sL is fs(z) Z f(z/s)/s, we
have
E

max
bz;sLZ Z bzbz zf ðzÞdzL
N
s
Zs
Zbz=s
N
	bz
s
w


fðwÞdwZsEL

max
bz
s
;L

:
This expression is increasing in s if bz  0. We proceed by
assuming bz  0.
EL½maxfbz;sLgZ Zbz
N
bz zfszdzþ 2bzPsLbz
þ
Z
bz
bzbz zfszdzZ Zbz
N
bz zfszdz
þ2bzPsLbzþ 2bzPbz sL 0
Z
Zbz
N
bz zfsðzÞdzþ bz;
where the second equality follows fromZ
bzbzðbz zÞfsðzÞdzZ
Z 0
bzðbz zÞfsðzÞdz
Z 0
bzðbzþ zÞfsðzÞdzZ
2bzP½bz  sL  0 which holds by the symmetry of f. By
using the same argument as above, the above expression is
also increasing in s. This implies that the indifference pricebpLB is decreasing in the standard deviation s.)
Now, we address the manufacturer’s decision for
determining both the number of contracts q and the
contract price bp. It turns out that there is no reason why
the manufacturer should set the contract price bp any
higher than the minimum price bpLB required to induce the
farmers to participate. Furthermore, if a contract is
offered to the farmer, then the number of contracts should
be just enough to cover the demand for the product. These
results are obvious and stated formally in the following
proposition.
Proposition 1. Suppose that both D Z d and Y Z y are
deterministic. Then, the manufacturer’s optimal choice of
q and bp in step (i) are given by the following: if
.bpLB > r or EPrmaxbpLB;P KFþ EP ½r ðPþ KMÞþ;
(7)
then q Z 0; otherwise,
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In the statement of Proposition 1, the first condition of (7)
ensures the farmer’s participation, and the second condi-
tion ensures that the contract yields lower expected profit
than the case of procuring directly from the market (i.e.,
no contract). The proof of Proposition 1 appears in
Appendix A.1.Under the optimal decision of the manufac-
turer given in Proposition 1, no contract is offered and
signed if (7) holds, in which case the manufacturer procures
all of d units from the market provided that the realised
market price is favourable to do so, i.e., P þ KM x r. If
a contract is signed with the contract price bpLB  r and the
quantity qZ d/y, then the manufacturer can procure up to
d units through the contracted farmers (either though the
original contracts that are ordered or through counteroffers
made to these farmers). It can be shown that she procures
exactly d units at price maxfbp;P KFg if P  r þ KF;
otherwise she does not procure any unit. Then, her profit
under this contract is d$½rmaxfbpLB;P KFgþ, and the
manufacturer would offer this contract if the expected
profit from the contract is higher than the case where no
contract is offered. In summary, the manufacturer’s
optimal expected profit PM satisfies.
PMZmax
n
d$E

rmaxbpLB;P KFþ; d$E½r ðPþ KMÞþo:
(8)
Since the second argument in the maximum operator
above corresponds to PNCM , it is straightforward to verify
from (2) that PM  PNCM , i.e., the manufacturer’s expected
profit can only increase if the contract is implemented.
(This result makes sense since the manufacturer could
always set the contract quantity q at zero, in which case
there is no contract.) The incremental benefit of the
contract is high if the farmer’s opportunity cost is low
(represented by low bp), or the transportation costs KF and
KM are high (resulting in a localised market of the farm
crop).We note that from the choice of bpLB, the farmer’s
expected utility is always PFZE½UðCÞ. Thus, the gains of
contract farming, if any, are captured completely by the
manufacturer.
Contract without reneging
We now consider a modification of our model in which the
farmer does not have any freedom to renege on the
contract, and he must honour the contract price bp
regardless of the outcome of the market price P. The
farmer honours the contract because of legal conse-
quences or because of the risk of severing the long-term
relationship with the manufacturer. We analysed this
model to address the question of whether or not elimi-
nating the farmer’s reneging behaviour would benefit the
manufacturer.
When reneging is not allowed, the amount of inventory
that the manufacturer receives at the end of step (i) is
always x Z y$q, and each farmer receives y$bp from the
manufacturer. Thus, the farmer’s participation constraints
(5) and (6) can be modified asUy$bp EC½UðCÞ; which is equivalent to bp bpNRLB ; (9)
for an appropriately defined choice of bpNRLB . (Here, the
superscript NR represents “no reneging”.) From (5), (6) and
(9), it can easily be shown that
bpLB  bpNRLB : (10)
This result indicates that the contract price without
reneging must be higher than the contract price with
reneging. The difference in the contract price corresponds
to the price of the farmer’s option for reneging.
We can also obtain a result analogous to Proposition 1,
that the optimal choice of the contract price bp is given bybpZbpNRLB , and that the optimal choice of q is either 0 or d/y.
More precisely,
qZd=y and bpZbpNRLB if r bpNRLB  EP ½r ðPþ KMÞþ
qZ0 otherwise:
From this, we can obtain that the manufacturer’s ex-
pected profit is given by
PNRM Zmax
n
d$

r bpNRLB; d$E½r ðPþ KMÞþo: (11)
As before, we obtain from (2) that PNRM  PNCM . Also, we
can also show that the farmer’s expected utility satisfies
PNRF ZE½UðCÞ, and the manufacturer captures all the gains
of contract farming. Thus, even if reneging is not allowed,
the manufacturer prefers the case with contract to the case
without contract. However, the relative ranking between
the two contracts (with or without reneging) is not clear,
and this question is investigated below.
Comparison of the three models
Thus far, we have considered and analysed each of the
three models that distinguish themselves based on the
three types of contracts: no contract, contract with
reneging and contract without reneging. We now compare
these three models, focusing on the expected profit of the
manufacturer.
We first note that in all of the three models, the ex-
pected utility of the farmer remains the same at E½UðCÞ e
this is an artifact of our modelling assumption that the
manufacturer is the Stackelberg leader. We now compare
the manufacturer’s expected profits in these three models.
From (8), (11) and (2),
PMZd$max
n
E

rmaxbpLB;P KFþ;E½r ðPþ KMÞþo;
PNRM Zd$max
n
r bpNRLB; E½r ðPþ KMÞþo; and
PNCM Zd$E½r ðPþ KMÞþ:
(The above quantities PM, P
NR
M , and P
NC
M refer to the
manufacturer’s expected profit under contract with
reneging, contract without reneging, and no contract,
respectively.)
ab
Figure 1 Effect of the volatility in market price P. Deter-
ministic Y and D. Risk-neutral farmer. R, NR and NC refer to the
contract with reneging, contract with no reneging, and no
contract, respectively.
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have noted before. This result makes sense since the
manufacturer always has the option of refusing to offer any
contract, and thus the availability of the contract should
not decrease her expected profit.
Case: risk-neutral farmer
We are interested in comparing the manufacturer’s ex-
pected profit under the two different types of the
contracts: one with reneging and one without reneging. In
general, a ranking between these contracts cannot be
established (which can be deduced from the expressions of
PM and P
NR
M as well as (10)). Yet, in the special case that
the farmer is risk-neutral, i.e., U is linear, such a ranking
can be established. The following result shows that the
manufacturer’s expected profit is higher if the farmer is
allowed to renege (which is our original model).
Theorem 2. Suppose that both D Z d and Y Z y are
deterministic. If the farmer is risk-neutral, then
YNC
M

YNR
M

Y
M
:
Proof. To prove the ranking betweenPNRM andP

M in the above
statement, note that a comparison of (5) and (9) implies that
EmaxfbpLB;P KFgZbpNRLB . Then, from the expressions of PM
andPNRM above, we can deduce thatP

M  PNRM .
Given that reneging results in the manufacturer’s uncer-
tainty of the supply quantity and price, the phenomenon that
PM PNRM can be somewhat counter-intuitive. However, such
an observation can be partially explained by the fact that
reneging allows the manufacturer to enjoy a lower contract
price since the contract price adjusts for the reneging option
of the farmer (see (10)). Furthermore, reneging allows the
system (consisting of both themanufacturer and farmers) the
flexibility of selling the crop to the outside market when the
market price P is high, and the benefit of such flexibility is
captured by themanufacturer. To support this, it can be seen
from (5) and (9) that the manufacturer’s benefit from
allowing the farmers to renege increases as P becomes more
variable.
We present the results of a numerical computation.
Throughout the paper, we use the following parameters
unless otherwise stated:
 r Z 6, KM Z KF Z 0.5, C Z 5.
 E[P] Z 5.5, D Z d Z 200, Y Z y Z 1.0.
 P is uniformly distributed and CV[P] Z 0.2.
Recall that in this section we assume deterministic DZ d
and YZ y. In Fig. 1, we observe the impact of the volatility in
the market price P as we vary its coefficient of variation
(CV). We observe that the manufacturer’s profit without any
contract, PNCM , increases with the volatility in P. This result,
which can in fact be deduced from (2), follows from the fact
that the manufacturer has the flexibility of producing only
when the market price is favourable in comparison to the
sales price r. We also observe that, without reneging, the
manufacturer’s profit and the contract price remain
constant e except when the market price uncertainty is so
high that it would be beneficial to abandon the contract
(which occurs when CV of P exceeds 0.4 in the plots). With
reneging, the manufacturer’s expected profit is also highwhen the market price is volatile. The increase in her profit
is due to the fact that she can offer a lower contract price bp
to the farmer, who sees an increase in the potential value
resulting from the option of reneging. The numerical results
confirm the relative ranking of the manufacturer’s expected
profits given in Theorem 2.
REMARK: For the numerical results, we have taken the
approach of discretising each random variable by collecting
500 samples based on equally-spaced fractiles.
Case: risk-averse farmer
If the farmer is risk-averse, then the expected profit
ranking result of Theorem 2 no longer holds. Since the
farmer’s revenue is deterministic when there is no reneging
but it is stochastic when there is reneging, the farmer’s
threshold for accepting a contract price is increased with
risk aversion. (Mathematically, (5) and (9) together imply
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therefore it is possible that PM may be lower than P
NR
M .)
For our numerical computation, we adopt the following
utility function UðzÞZ½1 expðlzÞ=l where l > 0. Since
UðzÞ/z as l Y 0, we also define UðzÞZz if lZ 0. Note that
this utility function displays the “constant absolute risk
aversion” property, i.e., U00ðzÞ=U0ðzÞ is a constant. We
make the following assumption unless otherwise stated:
 l Z 0.2 in the definition of UðzÞZ½1 expðlzÞ=l.
Fig. 2 plots the effect of the market price uncertainty on
the manufacturer’s profit and the contract price when the
farmer is risk-averse. While this figure displays a similar
pattern as in Fig. 1 (where the farmer is risk-neutral), we
remark on how Fig. 2 differs from Fig. 1. While the contract
price remains the same if the contract does not allow
reneging, it is higher in the risk-neutral case if the contracta
b
Figure 2 Effect of the volatility in market price P. Deter-
ministic Y and D. Risk-averse farmer with lZ 0.2. R, NR and NC
refer to the contract with reneging, contract with no reneging,
and no contract, respectively.allows reneging. Such an increase in the contract price can
be accounted for by the farmer’s aversion to profit uncer-
tainty, which results in the decrease in the manufacturer’s
expected profit. Thus, the relationship PNRM  PM may not
hold (see Fig. 2(a) when the CV of P is 0.10 or 0.15).
In Fig. 3, we investigate the impact of the farmer’s risk
aversion. We observe that the change in the risk aversion
does not affect the manufacturer’s expected profit if
there is no contract or if the contract does not allow
reneging. In the case where the contract allows reneging,
as the risk aversion parameter l increases, the contract
price increases and the manufacturer’s expected profit
decreases.
In summary, we observe that contracts can significantly
improve the expected profit of the manufacturer. The
manufacturer prefers the contract with reneging to the
contract without reneging when the farmer is risk-neutral,
but this benefit decreases (and may become negative) as
the farmer’s risk aversion increases. Also, the reneginga
b
Figure 3 Effect of the farmer’s risk aversion l. Deterministic
Y and D. R, NR and NC refer to the contract with reneging,
contract with no reneging, and no contract, respectively.
196 W.T. Huh et al.feature becomes more attractive as the market price
becomes more volatile.
Stochastic yield and demand
In the previous section, we have assumed that while the
market price P and the opportunity cost C are stochastic,
the yield Y and demand D are deterministic. This assump-
tion made the analysis relatively simple. In this section, we
allow both Y and D to be also stochastic. We follow an
organisational structure similar to that of the previous
section. We first study the case where there is no contract.
Next, analyse the original model with reneging followed by
a study of the case without reneging. Finally, we compare
the manufacturer’s expected profits.
A benchmark model: without contract
We first consider the benchmark case where no contract is
offered when both Y and D are stochastic. In this case, the
farmer’s expected utility is EC½UðCÞ. The manufacturer’s
expected profit is, from (1),
PNCM ZEP;Y
h
max
z0
f z$ðPþ KMÞ þ rED½minfD;zgg
i
:
Contract with reneging: analysis
We now address the original model described in the section
entitled “Model” where the manufacturer may offer
a contract that allows the farmer to renege once the
market price is realised. We analyse the decisions in the
sequence of events in a backward manner.
Step (iv): manufacturer’s decision for z
The manufacturer makes her decision for the production
quantity z in step (iv). At this point, uncertainties involving
Y Z y and P Z p have already been resolved, but D is still
unknown. Recall that x is the amount of farm crop that the
farmers have delivered to the manufacturer according to
the original terms of the contract, and that there are
a total of y$q units of the crop harvested by all the farmers,
where x  y$q. Thus, it follows that the manufacturer can
procure up to y$q  x additional units at the price of p  KF
each (by making counteroffers), and any further unit at the
price of p þ KM each (from the market). Since the manu-
facturer’s revenue is given by r$min{D, z}, her problem of
determining optimal z in this step can be formulated as
follows:
max
zx
ðminfz;y$qg xÞ$ðp KFÞ  ½z y$qþ$ðpþ KMÞ
þ r$ED½minfD;zg:PMZE
(
Y$q$bp ½z Y$qþ$ðPþ KMÞ þ rminfD;zg
minfz;Y$qg$ðP KFÞ  ½z Y$qþ$ðPþ KMÞ þ rminfD;zTo solve this problem, we note that it is essentially
a variation of a newsvendor problem where the starting
inventory is x, a limited number of units can be acquired at
a lower cost p  KF, and finally the remaining units can be
procured at a higher cost p þ KM. Based on this intuition, we
obtain the following proposition, which finds the solution to
the above optimisation problem. We denote the optimal
value of z by z(q, p, y).
Proposition 3. Suppose that both D and y are stochastic.
Then, the manufacturer’s optimal choice of z in step (iv) is
given by
zðq;p;yÞZmaxfminfy$q;z0ðpÞg;z00ðpÞ;xg;
where z
0
(p) and z
00
(p) are given by
z0ðpÞZinf

z 0 : P½D z  r Pþ KF
r

and
z00ðpÞZinf

z 0 : P½D z  r P KM
r

:
The result of Proposition 3 can be interpreted as follows.
Given the starting inventory level x, order-up-to z
0
(p) subject
to an upper boundof y$qe this quantity is procuredbymaking
counteroffers to reneged farmers. If the resulting inventory is
still below z
00
(p), then order-up-to z
00
(p) by procuring from the
market. The proof of Proposition 3 appears in Appendix A.2.
Step (iii): farmer’s decision for reneging
The farmer’s decision in step (iii) on whether to honour or
renege on the contract is exactly the same as in the
previous section with deterministic yield and demand.
Thus, the result of equation (4) remains valid here, i.e.,
x Z y$q if p  bpþ KF and x Z 0 otherwise. (Note that the
reference to (4) should be modified accounting for the
context of this section; namely, y and p should be replaced
with Y and P, respectively.)
Step (i): manufacturer’s decision for bp and q
Moving backwards, consider the manufacturer’s decision for bp
and q in step (i). For the contract to be acceptable to the
farmers,we requirea condition that ensures their participation.
EP;Y
UY$maxbp;P KF EC½UðCÞ: (12)
The above condition is exactly the same as (5), except
that the expectation is also taken with respect to stochastic
Y. Since the left-hand-side expression of the above inequality
is increasing in bp, this condition can also be expressed asbp bpLB
for some bpLB. This inequality is similar to (6), but the exact
value of bpLB is different from the case of deterministic yield
and demand for the reason mentioned above.
We consider the impact of Y on the farmer’s indifference
price bpLB. (We have already considered the impact of P in
Section 3.) As the yield P increases stochastically, the left-if P  bpþ KF
g otherwise:
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more attractive, and thus the farmer is more willing to
plant the crop despite the fact that the contract price may
be lower, resulting in a lower value of bpLB. The variability of
P does not have any impact on bpLB under the assumptions of
a risk-neutral farmer and the independence of Y and P.
The expression for the manufacturer’s expected profit
given in equation (1) can be simplified as follows using the
farmer’s reneging decision in (4):
The right-hand-side expressions in these two cases
are the same except for their first terms. In attempting to
unify these two cases, we introduce the following definition:
w

q; bp;z;p;yZminfz;y$qg$maxbp;p KF
 ½z y$qþ$ðpþ KMÞ þ rEDminfD;zg:
(The above definition is similar to the definition of
wðq; bp; z; pÞ given in the proof of Proposition 1.) Note that if
p  bpþ KF, then the choice of z must satisfy z  x Z p$q.
Thus, it can be written that the manufacturer’s expected
profit satisfies
PMZEP;Y;D

w

q; bp;z;P;Y:
Then, the manufacturer’s problem in step (i) is to choosebp and q to maximise
EP;Y
h
max
zY$q
w

q; bp;z;P;Y$1P  bpþ KFi
þ EP;Y
h
max
z0
w

q; bp;z;P;Y$1P > bpþ KFi; (13)
subject to bp  bpLB. As in our discussion in the previous
section, the optimal choice of bp is bpLB regardless of the
value of q. Now, the following proposition shows that the
above objective function is concave in q. The proof of this
result is based on the preservation of concavity under the
maximum and expectation operators, and appears in
Appendix A.3.
Proposition 4. Suppose that both D and Y are stochastic.
(i) If p  bpLB þ KF, then wðq; bpLB; z;p; yÞ is jointly concave
in fðq; zÞjq  0; z  y$qg.
(ii) If p > bpLB þ KF, then wðq; bpLB; z; p; yÞ is jointly concave
in fðq; zÞjq  0; z  0g.
(iii) In the manufacturer’s problem of maximizing
(13) with respect to ðbp; qÞ, the optimal choice of bp isbpLB, and this objective function is concave in q.
Thus, the manufacturer’s optimal expected profit,
denoted by PM, is easy to find by maximizing a single-
variable concave function.
Contract with reneging
We consider a modification of the original model in which
the farmer now cannot renege on the contract. This is the
same modification that was introduced in the previous
section. The contracted farmer must sell all of his crops to
the manufacturer (and the manufacturer must purchase
these crops) at the contract price bp.In this case, the farmer’s reneging decision in step (iii) of
the model does not exist. When the manufacturer sets the
contract price bp in step (i), she must consider the farmer’s
outside option to ensure his participation. Thus, the
following constraint is imposed on the choice of bp:
EP;Y
UY$bp EC½UðCÞ; which is equivalent to bp bpNRLB ;
(14)
for an appropriately defined choice of bpNRLB . (Note that this
constraint is a modification of (9) that accounts for the
randomness in Y, and the value of bpNRLB is in general different
from the quantity defined in Section 3.3.) From (12) and
(14), it can be also be shown that
bpLB  bpNRLB :
In determining the optimal manufacturer’s decision
ðbp;qÞ, it can be shown using previous arguments that her
profit is non-increasing in bp. Thus, bpZbpNRLB is the optimal
contract price if any contract is offered. If bpNRLB > r, then
the manufacturer does not make any profit from the con-
tracted crops, and thus she does not offer any contract.
Thus, each farmer’s expected utility is EC[U(C )]. We
proceed by assuming bpNRLB  r. Then, from the above
discussion and (1), the manufacturer’s expected profit can
be written as
E

PNRM ðqÞ

ZEP;Y
h
 Y$q$bpNRLB þmax
zY$q
f ½z Y$q$ðPþ KMÞ
þ rED½minfD;zgg
i
:
(15)
The manufacturer’s objective in step (i) is to choose q to
maximise the expected value E½PNRM ðqÞ where the expec-
tation is taken with respect to Y and P as well as D; the
recourse decision z is made after Y and P are realised, but
before D is realised. Note that if Y is deterministic and
the second purchase opportunity (represented by z) does
not exist, then the above function is the objective of
a newsvendor problem. Thus, our problem is an extension
of the newsvendor model with the features of the
random yield (see, for example, Yano and Lee (1995))
and also the second purchase opportunity with price
uncertainty.
Let z(q, Y, P) denote the optimal value of z in the defi-
nition (15) of E½PNRM ðqÞ for given q, Y and P. Let z
0
(P) be
defined as in the statement of Proposition 3. Clearly, z
0
(P) is
a decreasing function of P. The proof of Proposition 5 is
straightforward and appears in Appendix A.3.
Proposition 5. Consider a modification of the model where
reneging is not allowed. Suppose that both D and Y are
stochastic. Then, z(q, y, p) follows an order-up-to policy
with the base stock level of z
0
(p), and E½PNRM ðqÞ is concave
in q.
We denote the optimal expected revenue of the manu-
facturer by PNRM Zmaxq0E½PNRM ðqÞ.
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Figure 4 Effect of the yield uncertainty. Deterministic D.
Risk-averse farmer with l Z 0.2. R, NR and NC refer to the
contract with reneging, contract with no reneging, and no
contract, respectively.
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For the stochastic yield and demand, we have considered
each of the three cases distinguished by the types of the
contract, and described how to solve each of the cases. In
this section, we use numerical results to compare these
three cases. Our example is based on the one introduced
previously.
Effect of yield uncertainty
We first study the impact of yield uncertainty by using
a uniform distribution for the yield distribution. In Fig. 4,
we fix the mean of the yield distribution E[Y]Z 1, and vary
the coefficient of variation (CV) of the yield distribution Y
between 0 and 0.4. From Fig. 4(b), we observe that the
contract price is increasing as the yield uncertainty
increases, regardless of whether reneging is allowed or not.
If reneging is not allowed, the uncertainty in yield produces
the farmer’s revenue uncertainty, which increases the
contract price since the farmer is risk-averse. If reneging is
allowed, the compounding uncertainty of yield and price
causes a steeper increase in the contract price.
In Fig. 4(c), we plot the contract quantity q as a function
of the yield uncertainty. As yield becomesmore variable, the
manufacturer is less willing to commit a large quantity on the
contract due to the fear of disposing excess farm crop that
she does not use; she is more inclined to use a more reliable
option of purchasing from the outside market. Also note that
the contract quantity is always higher with reneging
compared to the case without reneging. This makes sense
since reneging implies that the manufacturer does not
always receive the contract quantity.When themarket price
is low, farmers do not renege and the manufacturer receives
all of the produced farm crop. This is a desirable outcome for
the manufacturer since the margin is high and the manu-
facturer would like to produce a large quantity of the
product. When the market price is high, farmers renege on
the contract, and this is also the desired outcome for the
manufacturer since the manufacturer does not want to
produce a large quantity when themargin is low. Thus, under
the possibility of reneging, the contract quantity is deter-
mined by considering a conditional distribution of the price
that it is below a certain threshold (thus resulting in a higher
production quantity).
The above discussion leads to the following observation
of the profit ranking PNCM  PNRM  PM found in Fig. 4(a). We
also observe that the expected profit decreases in yield
uncertainty, which can be explained by the fact that the
manufacturer makes decisions before uncertainties are
resolved, and that she has to pay a higher contract price to
the farmer. Fig. 4 shows that the reduction in the yield
uncertainty produces an increased profit to the manufac-
turer, an increased farmer’s willingness for contract
farming, and an increase in use of the contract. In practice,
the yield uncertainty reduction can be achieved through
the availability of technology, irrigation and fertilizer.
Effect of demand uncertainty
In Fig. 5, we study the impact of demand uncertainty. We
use a normal distribution for demand D where the mean is
fixed at E[D] Z 200 and the coefficient of variation (CV)
ab
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Figure 5 Effect of the yield uncertainty. Deterministic D.
Risk-averse farmer with l Z 0.2. R, NR and NC refer to the
contract with reneging, contract with no reneging, and no
contract, respectively.
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cated at 0. (The yield is deterministic at Y Z 1.)
Fig. 5(b) shows that the contract price does not depend
on demand uncertainty. This can be deduced directly from
the expressions of the contract prices bpNRLB and bpNRLB given in
(14) and (12). In Fig. 5(c), we observe that the contract
quantities decline in demand uncertainty, and that the
contract quantity is higher if reneging is allowed. Both of
these observations can be explained by a similar argument
used in the yield uncertainty case.
From Fig. 5(a), the manufacturer’s profits decline in
demand uncertainty in all three cases. We see that the
benefit of the contract is highest when the demand is
deterministic, and this benefit decreases in demand
uncertainty. While this benefit erodes to zero if the
contract does not allow reneging, it is still possible to
squeeze some benefit with the contract that does allow for
reneging. In fact, the benefit of reneging (the difference of
the expected profits under two types of contract) actually
increases in demand uncertainty.
From the numerical results, we conclude that putting in
place a contract provides an increased expected profit to
the manufacturer compared to the case without any
contract, and also that the reneging feature can be bene-
ficial to the manufacturer. In summary, reneging is partic-
ularly useful when market price is volatile, the farmer is
risk-neutral, and the demand is uncertain.Concluding remarks
In this paper, we have considered the farmer’s reneging
option in the context of contract farming, and demonstrated
that such an option can improve the expected profit of the
manufacturer. Such an improvement can be expected when
the farmer is risk-neutral (such that some fluctuation in his
profit would not be undesirable), when the market price is
volatile (such that the manufacturer’s production quantity
can be more freely adjusted to the market price), and when
the demand uncertainty is high (such that the profit function
is not very sensitive to supply reduction).
We expect that the contract farming framework outlined
in this paper would serve as a prototype as we develop
a more detailed high-accuracy contract farming model that
could be used for multinational corporations engaged in the
practice of contract farming. This involves identifying the
farmer’s decision criteria, as modeled in Huh and Lall
(2008), and understanding the manufacturer’s multi-
faceted objective structure e as well as setting up appro-
priate oversight and incentive mechanisms by regulatory
agencies.
A specific extension of the work presented here would be
to consider covariation in the uncertainty distribution of
yield Y and market price P. This is particularly relevant in
situations where aggregate regional production is highly
sensitive to regional climate exigencies and regional market
prices are affected by regional production given trans-
portation costs and constraints. Under such conditions,
public or private investment in reducing yield uncertainty
through (i) investment in irrigation technology; (ii) devel-
opment and communication of weather forecasts; and (iii)
the use of appropriate seeds and fertilizers, would lead to
200 W.T. Huh et al.a reduction in price uncertainty and possibly a decoupling of
the price and yield distributions. The framework presented
in this paper readily lends itself to an analysis of how much
investment the contract offerer, the farmer, or even the
government may want to make to reduce yield uncertainty
through themeans indicated above, or tomitigate its impact
by purchasing appropriately priced insurance products that
address price and/or yield uncertainty. We intend to pursue
these investigations using specific settings in India to provide
the applied context.
An additional goal is to generalise our analysis to
a framework in which farmers may have heterogeneous
utility functions and opportunity costs. Unfortunately,
much of the straightforward analysis that is carried out in
this paper would not readily extend to an asymmetric
economic environment. To complicate matters even
further, such information may be private. If it is, then the
task of designing a procedure to truthfully elicit it from the
farmers would raise nontrivial theoretical questions. We
plan to address these issues in future work.
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Appendix A
Proofs
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. If bpLB > r, then any contract price that would be
acceptable to the farmer results in loss for the manufac-
turer. Since there would be no contract that would be
acceptable to both the manufacturer and farmers in this
case, we set qZ 0. We proceed by assuming otherwise.
The manufacturer’s problem is to select q and bp to
maximise her expected profit, where expectation is taken
over P, given that the optimal recourse decision z in (3) is
made. (Recall (1) for the expression of her profit.) Define
w

q; bp;z;pZminfz;y$qg$maxbp;p KF
 ½z y$qþ$ðpþ KMÞ þ rminfd;zg;
which represents the net profit of the manufacturer asso-
ciated with the initial decisions ðq; bpÞ, the market crop
price p and the recourse action z. Then, from the expres-
sion of x given by (4), it can be shown that the manufac-
turer’s expected profit for a given pair of q and bp is
EP
h
max
zy$q
w

q; bp;z;P$1P  bpþ KFiþ EPh
 max
z0
w

q; bp;z;P$1P > bpþ KFi;
subject to the constraint (5) which ensures that the farmer
would accept the contract. (To prove this assertion, we usethe fact that x Z y$q in case of P  bpþ KF , and x Z 0 in
case of P > bpþ KF.) Note that the constraint (5) is equiv-
alent to (6), and that the two optimisation problems in the
above expression are identical except for the range of z for
the maximum operator. Since the first maximisation
problem is more restrictive and wðq; bp; z;pÞ is increasing inbp, it follows that bp should be set at bpLB regardless of the
value of q.
Now we investigate the optimal choice of q. Since the
demand and the yield are deterministically d and y
respectively, there is no reason to set q higher than d/y. In
fact, the contract quantity q should be one of the extreme
solutions, i.e., q ˛ {0, d/y}. Moreover, it can be shown that,
if q Z d/y, then the manufacturer’s profit is
EP ½r maxfbpLB; P  KFgþ multiplied by d; if q Z 0, then it
is EP[r  (P þ KM)]þ multiplied by d. By comparing these two
quantities, we obtain q Z d/y or q Z 0 accordingly.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. Since x$(p  KF) does not depend on z, the manu-
facturer’s objective is equivalent to maximising R(z) over
z  x, where we define
RðzÞZ z$ðp KFÞ  ½z y$qþ$ðKF þ KMÞ þ r$ED½minfD;zg:
Note that R is concave in z; in fact, it represents
a newsvendor revenue function where the purchase cost is
convex and piecewise linear in z. We separately consider
optimising R over two intervals: [0, y$q] and [y$q, N].
In the first interval [0, y$q], we have
RðzÞZ z$ðp KFÞ þ r$ED½minfD;zg:
Thus, the optimal value of z in this interval is min{y$q,
z
0
(p)}, where z
0
(p) is the solution to the newsvendor
problem with the overage cost of p  KF and the underage
cost of r  p þ KF.
In the second interval [y$q, N],
RðzÞZy$q$ðKF þ KMÞ  z$ðpþ KMÞ þ r$ED½minfD;zg:
Note that the first term in the above expression does not
depend on z. The optimal value of z in this interval is max
{y$q, z
00
(p)}, where z
00
(p) is the solution to the newsvendor
problem with the overage cost of p þ KM and the underage
cost of r  p  KM.
From the definitions of z
0
(p) and z
00
(p), it follows that
z
00
(p)  z0(p). The above analysis shows that the value of z
maximising R over the interval [0, N] is
8<:z
00ðpÞ if y$q z00ðpÞ
y$q if y$q˛½z00ðpÞ;z0ðpÞ and
z0ðpÞ if z0ðpÞ  y$q ;
which can be written as max{min{y$q, z
0
(p)}, z
00
(p)}.
Therefore, by the convexity of R, the value of z maximising
R in the interval [x, N] is max{min{y$q, z
0
(p)}, z
00
(p), x}.
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Proof.
(i) Suppose p  bpþ KF and z  y$q. Then, from the defi-
nition of wðq; bp; z;p; yÞ,
w

q; bp;z;p;yZ y$q$bp ½z y$q$ðpþ KMÞ þ rEDminfD;zg:
Since the first two terms are linear in (q, z) and the last
term is independent of q and concave in z, it follows that
the above expression is also in (q, z).
(ii) Suppose p > bpþ KF. Then, since min{z,
y$q} þ [z  y$q]þ Z z, we have
wðq; bp;z;p;yÞZminfz;y$qg$ðp KFÞþ½z y$q $ðpþ KMÞ þ rEDminfD;zg
Z z$ðp KFÞ  ½z y$qþ$ðKF þ KMÞþrEDminfD;zg;
which is clearly concave in (q, z).
(iii) The optimality of bpZbpLB follows the argument similar
to the one used in the section “Deterministic yield and
demand”. The concavity of (13) with respect to q for
fixed bp follows from parts (i) and (ii) above.
Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. We first consider the second replenishment decision
z given the earlier decision q and the realisations of y and p.
The maximisation problem in (15) is concave in z. Let z
0
(p)
be the optimal value of z provided that qZ 0, and it is easy
to show that
z0ðpÞZinf

z 0 : P½D z  r pþ KF
r

:
Then, the optimal choice of z follows the order-up-to-
z
0
(p) policy, i.e., max{y$q, z
0
(p)}.
Now, the concavity of E½PNRM ðqÞ follows from the joint
concavity of [z  y$q]$(p þ KM) þ rED[min{D, z}] with
respect to (q, z) in (15) and the preservation of the
concavity under the maximum operator.
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